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LGBT RIGHTS:
GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN THE WORKPLACE
BY
TAYLOR E. MUZZY
Taylor Muzzy is a partner at the firm Jacobs, Burns, Orlove & Hernandez and is a 2008 graduate of
Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, with a certificate in Labor and
Employment Law.1 He represents: employees in employment discrimination, FLSA, FMLA, and wage
payment collection litigation; labor unions in grievance and interest arbitrations, unfair labor practice
proceedings, contract negotiations; and federal and state litigation; and public pension funds with
respect to compliance issues and federal and state litigation. Thanks to my colleague Charles P. Burns
his help in preparing this paper.

I. INTRODUCTION
Discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”)
individuals remains a significant factor in U.S. workplaces. According to research
conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago,
42 percent of LGBT individuals reported at least one form of employment
discrimination because of their sexual orientation, and 27 percent reported
experiencing such discrimination in the past five years.[1] Research shows even
more striking results with respect to discrimination against transgender
individuals: the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey revealed that 77 percent of
respondents who held or applied for a job in the past year reported experiencing
some form of discrimination or taking steps to avoid discrimination at work,[2]
and 27 percent reported experiencing an adverse job outcome due to their gender
identity or expression in the past year.[3] Transgender individuals are three times
more likely than the U.S. adult population to be unemployed, more than twice as
likely to be living in poverty, and more than three times as likely to have an annual
household income below $10,000.[4] These numbers increase dramatically when
race, disabilities, and status as undocumented residents are considered.[5]
Despite these troubling results, 69 percent of respondents who were fired because
of their gender identity or expression took no action in response to being fired and
only 14 percent filed a formal complaint, either internally or with the EEOC or state
or local human rights agency; 15 percent contacted a lawyer; and a paltry 2 percent
contacted their union representative.[6] This low rate of protest may be partially
attributed to the fact that there are currently no federal laws that explicitly prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender
1 The Supreme Court of Illinois does not recognize certifications of specialties in the practice of law and the certificate is not a requirement to practice
law in Illinois.
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expression. In the absence of action by Congress, courts have expanded protections
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the First Amendment, and the Family and
Medical Leave Act.
This article surveys the current scope of LGBT protections for public employees
under federal and state law, and examines potential expansions of these
protections. Part II examines the extent to which federal and state laws have been
successful in bringing sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression
under the umbrella of currently-existing legislative or constitutional protections.
Part III examines attempts to expand protections for LGBT employees and
assesses the potential for collective bargaining to provide expanded benefits in the
absence of legislative change.
A.

Glossary Of Terms

The language used to describe members of the LGBT community is highly variable,
and often incorporates factors of class, race, culture, region, education and age.[7]
This article uses the following definitions to provide a structure around which to
meaningfully and respectfully discuss LGBT issues in the workplace.[8]


Gender Dysphoria: Clinically significant distress caused when a person's
assigned birth gender is not the same as the one with which they identify.
According to the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the term – which replaces Gender Identity
Disorder – "is intended to better characterize the experiences of affected children,
adolescents, and adults."



Gender Expression: External appearance of one's gender identity, usually
expressed through behavior, clothing, haircut or voice, and which may or may not
conform to socially defined behaviors and characteristics typically associated with
being either masculine or feminine.



Gender Identity: One's innermost concept of self as male, female, a blend of both
or neither – how individuals perceive themselves and what they call themselves.
One's gender identity can be the same or different from their sex assigned at birth.



Gender Transition: The process by which some people strive to more closely
align their internal knowledge of gender with its outward appearance. Some people
socially transition, whereby they might begin dressing, using names and pronouns
and/or be socially recognized as another gender. Others undergo physical
transitions in which they modify their bodies through medical interventions.
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Sexual Orientation: An inherent or immutable enduring emotional, romantic
or sexual attraction to other people. A person's sexual orientation is distinct from
a person's gender identity and gender expression.



Transgender: An umbrella term for people whose gender identity and/or
expression is different from those typically associated with the sex assigned to
them at birth (e.g., the sex listed on their birth certificate). Being transgender does
not imply any specific sexual orientation. Transgender people may identify as
straight, gay, lesbian, bisexual, etc.

II. EXPANDING RIGHTS FOR LGBT EMPLOYEES UNDER
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW
A.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is an unlawful employment
practice for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”[9] Title VII applies to
employers with 15 or more employees, including state and local governments,
employment agencies, labor organizations, and the federal government.[10] While
Title VII does not specifically address sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender
expression, courts have interpreted Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination to
protect against discrimination based on sex stereotypes, and have further
expanded that protected classification to cover sexual orientation and gender
identity discrimination.
The Supreme Court laid the foundation for LGBT protections under Title VII in
two key decisions, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins[11] and Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services.[12] In Price Waterhouse, an accounting firm denied Ann
Hopkins a promotion because other partners at the firm felt that she did not act as
a woman should act and told her that she needed to “walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, [and] dress more femininely” in order to secure a
partnership.[13] The Supreme Court held that Title VII’s “because of sex” provision
prohibits the “entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting
from sex stereotypes.”[14] As the Court explained, “an employer who acts on the
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has
acted on the basis of gender.”[15] Nearly a decade later, in Oncale, the Supreme
Court held that same-sex harassment can be sex discrimination under Title VII.[16]
The Court noted that, while same-sex harassment was "assuredly not the principal
evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII, the prohibition on
sexual harassment “must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the
statutory requirements.”[17]
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Federal Court Decisions Finding Coverage for Sexual Orientation
Discrimination

In response to the Price Waterhouse and Oncale decisions, many federal courts
have found that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation constitutes a form
of discrimination based on sex. Courts are divided, however, as to whether sexual
orientation discrimination constitutes sex stereotype discrimination per se or
whether discrimination is actionable only when it is based on sex stereotyping
irrespective of an employee’s sexual orientation. For example, in Heller v.
Columbia Edgewater Country Club, a Title VII sex harassment case brought by a
lesbian employee who was subjected to negative comments about her sex life, the
court reasoned that the belief that men or women should only be attracted to or
date persons of the opposite sex constitutes a gender stereotype.[18] Similarly, in
Terveer v. Billington, an employee alleged that his employer violated Title VII by
denying him promotions and creating a hostile work environment because he was
"a homosexual male whose sexual orientation is not consistent with the
Defendant's perception of acceptable gender roles.”[19] The court held that an
employee’s claim that his supervisor discriminated against him because he is
married to a man and took his husband's last name “is a claim of discrimination
because of sex.”[20] In both Heller and Terveer, the courts found that because
sexual orientation discrimination is necessarily premised on the gender of the
employee and the employee’s preferred romantic partners, sexual orientation
discrimination is per se discrimination based on the sex.
In contrast, other courts have attempted to distinguish between discrimination
targeting sexual orientation and discrimination based on nonconformity with
sexual stereotypes. These courts hold that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination
based on nonconformity with gender stereotypes "should not be used to 'bootstrap
protection for sexual orientation into Title VII.’”[21] Thus, while discrimination on
the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation may be actionable, it must be
connected directly to gender stereotypes. For example, in EEOC v. Boh Brothers
Construction Co., the heterosexual male plaintiff endured abuse in the form of
sexual slurs, acts, and sexual-orientation based epithets from his heterosexual
male supervisor.[22] The court held that the conduct was actionable, finding that
although
[i]t may be difficult judicially to assess whether and how harassment between two
members of the same sex, neither of whom is homosexual, is ‘because of’ the victim’s sex…
cruelty and irrationality typify harassment, prejudice, stereotyping and hostility generally
… and we echo the Supreme Court's confidence that "[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate
sensitivity to social context will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple
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teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct which a
reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive.[23]
A New York District Court recently explained this distinction in Christiansen v.

Omnicom, Group, Inc., holding that allegations of harassment that included lewd
pictures of the plaintiff drawn on the office white board, remarks about the
plaintiff’s sexuality, and other derogatory conduct, demonstrated “sexualorientation-based discriminatory animus.”[24] However, the court found that the
plaintiff failed to prove he was harassed because he was effeminate or otherwise
failed to conform to gender stereotypes and that therefore it was bound to apply
Second Circuit precedent disallowing Title VII sex discrimination claims based on
sexual orientation.[25] Nevertheless, the court included an extensive critique of
that precedent and others, observing, "In light of the EEOC's recent decision on
Title VII's scope, and the demonstrated impracticality of considering sexual
orientation discrimination as categorically different from sexual stereotyping, one
might reasonably ask - and, lest there be any doubt, this Court is asking - whether
that line should be erased.”[26]
Federal Court Decisions Finding Coverage for Transgender
Discrimination

Many federal courts have also applied Title VII’s prohibition on sex stereotyping
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity and expression.[27] As
with sexual orientation, courts are divided as to whether discrimination on the
basis of gender identity or expression constitutes per se sex discrimination. For
some courts, the application of the Supreme Court’s Title VII sex discrimination
precedent to gender identity and expression is more straightforward than in the
case of sexual orientation. For example, in Finkle v. Howard County,, the court
held an employee’s allegations she was discriminated against “because of her
obvious transgendered status” raised a cognizable claim of sex discrimination
because: “it would seem that any discrimination against transsexuals (as
transsexuals) - individuals who, by definition, do not conform to gender
stereotypes - is proscribed by Title VII's proscription of discrimination on the basis
of sex as interpreted by Price Waterhouse.”[28] Likewise, in Fabian v. Hospital of
Central Connecticut, the court held that “[e]mployment discrimination on the
basis of transgender identity is employment discrimination ‘because of sex’ and
constitutes a violation of Title VII.”[29] In Smith v. City of Salem, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender
individuals based on gender stereotyping, stating:
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After Price Waterhouse, an employer who discriminates against women because, for
instance, they do not wear dresses or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination because
the discrimination would not occur but for the victim's sex. It follows that employers who
discriminate against men because they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act
femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination, because the discrimination would not
occur but for the victim's sex.[30]

The court rejected the argument that applying a label such as “transsexual,”
“homosexual,” or “transvestite” to gender non-conforming behavior removes it
from the protection of Title VII, explaining “discrimination against a plaintiff who
is a transsexual - and therefore fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender is no different from the discrimination directed against Ann Hopkins in Price
Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a woman.”[31]
Other courts have refused to find that discrimination on the basis of gender
identity or expression is per se discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes, but
nevertheless endorsed application of Title VII to discrimination based on gender
identity and expression. For example, in EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral
Homes, Inc., the court stated, “[I]f the EEOC's complaint had alleged that the
Funeral Home fired Stephens based solely upon Stephens's status as a transgender
person, then this Court would agree with the Funeral Home that the EEOC's
complaint fails to state a claim under Title VII.”[32] However, the court denied the
employer’s motion to dismiss, noting that any person – without regard to labels
such as transgender – can assert a sex-stereotyping gender-discrimination claim
… if that person’s failure to conform to sex stereotypes was the driving force behind
the termination.”[33]
EEOC Expands and Prosecutes LGBT Protections Under Title VII
In 2012, the EEOC issued a decision overturning nearly 40 years of EEOC precedent that had
rejected sex discrimination claims on the basis of gender identity. In Macy v. Department of
Justice, the EEOC held that discrimination on the basis of “gender identity, change of

sex, and/or transgender status are [per se] cognizable under Title VII’s sex
discrimination prohibition” and that “[a]lthough most courts have found
protection for transgender people under Title VII under a theory of gender
stereotyping, evidence of gender stereotyping is simply one means of proving sex
discrimination.”[34] The EEOC followed Macy with Jameson v. U.S. Postal
Service, where it held that the “[i]ntentional misuse of the [transgender]
employee’s new name and pronoun may cause harm to the employee, and may
constitute sex discrimination.”[35] In Complainant v. Department of Veteran
Affairs, the EEOC further held that an employer’s refusal to allow a transgender
employee permission to change his username to his legally changed name states a
valid Title VII claim.[36] Finally, in Lusardi v. Department of the Army, the EEOC
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held that the employer’s decision to prevent a transgender woman’s access to the
women’s restroom constitutes “direct evidence of discrimination on the basis of
sex” and further held that “supervisory or co-worker confusion or anxiety cannot
justify discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.”[37]
In the 2015 decision Baldwin v. Department of Transportation, the EEOC also
reversed its longstanding precedent and held that “sexual orientation is inherently
a ‘sex-based consideration,’ and an allegation of discrimination based on sexual
orientation is necessarily and allegation of sex discrimination under Title VII.”[38]
Since Baldwin, the EEOC has reported a 28 percent increase in the number of
LGBT charges filed in 2015[39] and has prosecuted several discrimination claims
based on sexual orientation and gender identity, resulting in settlement
agreements and consent decrees.[40]
Seventh Circuit Decisions

Until recently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals did not favor finding that Title
VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination protects the LGBT community.[41] In
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,[42] Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care
Ctr., Inc.,[43] Spearman v. Ford Motor Co.,[44] and Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk
Products, Inc.,[45] the Seventh Circuit held that there is a distinction between sex
and sexuality under Title VII and that the statute only prohibits discrimination
because of sex, meaning “biological male or biological female” and not sexual
orientation.
However, in 2014, in Muhammad v. Caterpillar Inc., the Seventh Circuit appeared
to signal a softening of its position regarding whether sexual orientation discrimination claims
are cognizable under Title VII.[46] In Muhammad, the plaintiff alleged that hostile work

environment harassment relating to his perceived sexual orientation was sexbased harassment in violation of Title VII. Although the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment to the employer, finding that the
employer took prompt remedial action upon being notified of the harassment, the
court amended its original decision after the plaintiff’s petition for rehearing and
eliminated language that had stated that sexual orientation-related discrimination
claims are not actionable under Title VII.
In 2017, in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, the Seventh Circuit sitting en
banc reversed its prior case law and held “that a person who alleges that she
experienced employment discrimination on the basis of her sexual orientation has
put forth a case of sex discrimination for Title VII purposes.”[47] Hively was an
open lesbian and a part-time adjunct professor who alleged that Ivy Tech refused
to interview her for open full-time positions and subsequently failed to renew her

SPRING 2017

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

11

contract, “based on my sexual orientation.”[48] The district court dismissed the
case on the ground that the Title VII does not apply to claims of sexual orientation
discrimination.[49]
In an exhaustive decision involving an extensive discussion of Title VII case law, a
Seventh Circuit panel affirmed, noting that “Congress has repeatedly rejected
legislation that would have extended Title VII to cover sexual orientation … even
in the face of an abundance of judicial opinions recognizing an emerging consensus
that sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace can no longer be
tolerated.”[50] The Court concluded that that, while “[i]t seems unlikely that our
society can continue to condone a legal structure in which employees can be fired,
harassed, demeaned, singled out for undesirable tasks, paid lower wages, demoted,
passed over for promotions, and otherwise discriminated against solely based on
who they date, love, or marry”, “[u]ntil the writing comes in the form of a Supreme
Court opinion or new legislation, we must adhere to the writing of our prior
precedent.”[51]
On October 11, 2016, the Seventh Circuit granted the plaintiff’s petition for a
rehearing en banc,[52] and, on March 30, 2017, a majority of the court reversed
the panel’s decision. First, the court reasoned that “the fact that the enacting
Congress may not have anticipated a particular application of the law cannot stand
in the way of the provisions of the law that are on the books.”[53] In a concurring
opinion, Judge Posner agreed that, because Title VII was more than half a century
old, the majority properly engaged in “judicial interpretive updating”, which is
necessary when “a lengthy interval between enactment and (re)interpretation”
occurs such the court must engage in “interpretation that will update it to the
present.”[54]
Second, the court applied the “comparative method,”[55] and found that Hively
had pleaded sex discrimination because “if she had been a man married to a
woman (or living with a woman, or dating a woman) and everything else had stayed
the same, Ivy Tech would not have refused to promote her and would not have fired
her.”[56] The court further noted,, “Viewed through the lens of the gender
nonconformity line of cases, Hively represents the ultimate case of failure to
conform to the female stereotype (at least as understood in a place such as modern
America, which views heterosexuality as the norm and other forms of sexuality as
exceptional): she is not heterosexual.”[57] The court eviscerated the requirement
that LGBT plaintiffs characterize their claims as being based on gender
stereotypes, stating that while “Our panel described the line between a gender
nonconformity claim and one based on sexual orientation as gossamer-thin; we
conclude that it does not exist at all.”[58]
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Finally, the court held that an action based on sexual orientation is sex
discrimination under the associational theory, which holds that a person who is
discriminated against because of her association with someone else is actually
disadvantaged because of her own traits. The court cited Loving v. Virginia[59] as
recognizing that “distinctions drawn according to race” are “unjustifiable and
racially discriminatory.”[60] The court held that if, instead of race, it was “to
change the sex of one partner in a lesbian relationship, the outcome would be
different”, revealing “that the discrimination rests on distinctions drawn according
to sex.”[61] The majority concluded that “It would require considerable
calisthenics to remove the ‘sex’ from ‘sexual orientation’ and that “the commonsense reality [is] that it is actually impossible to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation without discriminating on the basis of sex.”[62]
Equality Act[63]

In July 2015, Rep. Cicilline (D-RI) introduced H.R. 3185, the Equality Act, to
amend Title VII to specifically include sexual orientation and gender identity as
protected classifications. The Findings section of the Equality Act specifically notes
that LGBT employees “have been subjected to a history and pattern of persistent,
widespread, and pervasive discrimination on the bases of sexual orientation and
gender identity by private sector employers and Federal, State, and local
government employers,” and that “[t]he absence of explicit prohibitions of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity under Federal
statutory law, as well as some conflicting case law on how broadly sex
discrimination provisions apply, has created uncertainty for employers and other
entities covered by these laws.”[64] The Equality Act was referred to the House
Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice.
B.

The Equal Protection Clause and Section 1983

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o
state shall make or enforce any law which shall … deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”[65] Section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 creates a private right of action to remedy deprivations of federal rights
(including the rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause) by those acting
under the color of state law.[66]
There are three levels of scrutiny that courts apply to Equal Protection claims: (1)
strict scrutiny, which requires a regulation to be narrowly tailored to a compelling
governmental interest; (2) intermediate scrutiny, which requires a regulation to be
substantially related to an important governmental interest; and (3) rational basis
review, which requires a regulation to be rationally related to a legitimate

SPRING 2017

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

13

governmental interest.[67] While courts apply strict scrutiny to decisions based on
race and intermediate scrutiny to decisions based on gender, courts generally apply
the lowest-level, rational basis review to decisions based on sexual orientation.[68]
Courts have applied rational basis review to employment discrimination claims by
LGBT public employees and concluded that discrimination and harassment on the
basis of sexual orientation may violate the Equal Protection Clause.[69] In Quinn
v. Nassau County Police Department, the plaintiff was a gay police officer who
alleged he was subjected to a vicious campaign of harassment because of his sexual
orientation.[70] The district court found that “the United States Constitution and
the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, combined with logic, common sense and
fairness dictate the answer: individuals have a constitutional right under the Equal
Protection Clause to be free from sexual orientation discrimination causing a
hostile work environment in public employment.”[71] In Lovell v. Comsewogue
School District, the plaintiff was a 27-year art teacher.[72] Students filed a sexual
harassment complaint against the plaintiff with the principal, but the principal
failed to follow district policy by failing to inform the plaintiff about the complaint
and by failing to allow the plaintiff to present facts during the investigation into
the complaint.[73] The students then began to harass the plaintiff, using slurs
based on her sexual orientation, and the principal took no remedial action against
the students.[74] The district court denied the school district’s motion to dismiss,
finding that “harassment based on sexual orientation is a basis for an equal
protection claim under Section 1983.”[75]
The Equal Protection Clause also protects public employees from discrimination
on the basis of gender identity and expression. In Glenn v. Brumby, the plaintiff
was transitioning from male to female under the supervision of health care
providers.[76] While still presenting as a man, the plaintiff was hired as an editor
by the Georgia General Assembly’s Office of Legislative Counsel.[77] The plaintiff
subsequently informed her direct supervisor that she was transitioning to
becoming a woman and started coming to work presenting as a woman.[78] The
manager terminated the plaintiff because “[her] intended gender transition was
inappropriate, that it would be disruptive, that some people would view it as a
moral issue, and that it would make [her] coworkers uncomfortable.”[79] The
plaintiff brought a Section 1983 claim alleging unlawful discrimination in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.[80] The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied
intermediate scrutiny and affirmed the district court’s granting of summary
judgment to the plaintiff, concluding “that a government agent violates the Equal
Protection Clause’s prohibition on sex-based discrimination when he or she fires a
transgender or transsexual employee because of his or her gender nonconformity.”[81]
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First Amendment

Public employees have a First Amendment right to speak about sexual orientation
and to “come out” publicly.[82] In Van Ooteghem v. Gray,[83] the plaintiff was
hired by the County Treasurer as Cashier Assistant County Treasurer and later
promoted to Assistant County Treasurer. He was a non-tenured employee,
“performed his job in a professional manner” and was “recognized to be both hardworking and quite brilliant.”[84] Seven months after being hired, the plaintiff
informed the County Treasurer that he was gay and that he intended to address the
Commissioners Court on the subject of gay civil rights.[85] The County Treasurer
restricted the plaintiff’s work hours to prevent him from addressing the
Commissioners Court and later terminated his employment.[86] The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s finding that the plaintiff’s First
Amendment Right to speak about gay civil rights was violated.[87]
In Weaver v. Nebo School District,[88] the plaintiff was a teacher with 19 years of
service and volleyball coach with an excellent reputation and good to excellent
evaluations. While recruiting players for a summer volleyball camp, she was asked
by one of the players if she was gay and the plaintiff responded truthfully, “yes.”[89]
The team member said she would not play on the team and her parents informed
the school district administrators that the plaintiff was gay.[90] The administrators
decided that the plaintiff would not be the assigned volleyball coach and, in a letter,
advised the plaintiff that “[y]ou are not to make any comments, announcements or
statements to students, staff members, or parents of students regarding your
homosexual orientation or lifestyle.”[91] The plaintiff filed a First Amendment and
Section 1983 action challenging the restraints on her speech and her removal as a
volleyball coach.[92] Applying the two-part test from Pickering v. Board of
Education of Township High School District 205,[93] the district court granted
summary judgment to the plaintiff on all her claims and determined that, although
sexual orientation is “in essence” a private matter, the ongoing public debate
regarding the rights of homosexuals made it a matter of public concern, and that
the school system interests did not outweigh the plaintiff’s interests in expressing
her sexual orientation outside the classroom.[94]
Weaver was decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos,
which held that the First Amendment does not protect public employees’
statements made pursuant to their official duties.[95] Because the teacher
expressed her sexual orientation while attempting to recruit students for the
school’s volleyball team, her speech could be considered to have occurred pursuant
to her duties as a teacher and coach. In Garcetti, however, there was no dispute the
speech in question was made pursuant to the employee’s official duties and the

SPRING 2017

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

15

Court noted it had “no occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework for
defining the scope of an employee's duties in cases where there is room for serious
debate.”[96] The Court further rejected “the suggestion that employers can restrict
employees' rights by creating excessively broad job descriptions.”[97] Accordingly,
any First Amendment analysis under Weaver should be coupled with Garcetti and
its progeny.
In Scarbrough v. Morgan County Board of Education, the plaintiff was a former
school superintendent who was asked to say a prayer at a convention breakfast
hosted by a church with a predominantly gay congregation.[98] Although the
plaintiff declined due to a scheduling conflict, a newspaper incorrectly reported
that he would be a speaker at the convention.[99] The plaintiff was subsequently
denied the position of director of schools.[100] The plaintiff sued for violations of
his rights to freedom of speech and equal protection.[101] Reversing the district
court’s granting of summary judgment to the employer, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiff’s intended “speech concerned religion and perhaps
homosexuality, and was to occur on his own free time … and there is precedent for
recognizing that ‘certain private remarks … touch on matters of public
concern.’”[102] The Sixth Circuit applied rational basis scrutiny and held that
“[t]he desire to effectuate one’s animus against homosexuals can never be a
legitimate governmental purpose.”[103]
D.

Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)

The FMLA entitles public employees, who must have at least 1,250 hours of service
during the previous 12-month period,[104] to 12 weeks of unpaid leave to care for
their own serious health condition or the serious health condition of the employee’s
spouse, son, daughter, or parent.[105] The FMLA’s definition of “spouse” includes
same-sex marriage spouses.[106] In United States v. Windsor,[107] the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional Section 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined the term “marriage” under federal law as
“only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,” and
the word “spouse” as “only a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife.”
The U.S. Department of Labor issued a Final Rule, effective March 27, 2015,
defining “spouse” under the FMLA to guarantee employees in same–sex marriages
full FMLA rights, regardless of whether their marriage is recognized in the state in
which they reside, provided that the marriage is “recognized under state law for
purposes of marriage in the State in which the marriage was entered into or, in the
case of a marriage entered into outside of any State, if the marriage is valid in the
place where entered into and could have been entered into in at least one
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State.”[108] In Obergefell v. Hodges,[109] the U.S. Supreme Court struck down
state statutes limiting marriage to heterosexual couples removing any doubt that
employment-related benefits tied to marriage must apply equally to same-sex
spouses.
E.

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990[110]

The ADA prohibits discrimination against public employees on the basis of a
“disability,” which means: a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities; a record of such impairment, or being
regarding as having such impairment.[111] However, despite recent enactment of
the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), the purpose of which was to make
it easier for people with disabilities to obtain protection under the ADA,[112] the
ADA specifically provides that the definition of “disability” does not include
“[h]omosexuality and bisexuality” or “[t]ransvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia,
exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical
impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders.”[113]
In the 2014 lawsuit Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., transgender woman Kate Lynn
Blatt, a stocker at Cabela’s who was prohibited from using the women’s restroom
and was forced to wear a nametag depicting her name as “James,” even though she
had a legal name change to her female name, claimed that the ADA’s exclusion of
gender identity disorders from the definition of disability violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.[114] The case is still pending.
F.

Health Care Taxability and Non-Discrimination

The cost of gender transition medical expenses may be tax deductible. In
O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the U.S. Tax Court held that
a transgender woman who was diagnosed with gender identity disorder was
permitted to deduct the cost of her gender transition therapy and surgeries,
including transportation and other related expenses, as a medical expenses
deduction under the Internal Revenue Code.[115] The Tax Court held that gender
identity disorder was a “disease” within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code
and that the therapy and procedures were for the treatment of the disease and not
cosmetic surgery (except for her breast augmentation surgery, which the Court
found was cosmetic surgery).[116]
Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act prohibits discrimination in health care
participation and benefits on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age or
disability, as defined in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
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of 1975, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.[117] Effective July 18,
2016, the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (HHS), Office for Civil
Rights (“OCR”), which enforces the non-discrimination provision, issued a final
rule that includes gender identity in the definition of “sex” as a protected
classification.[118]
The final rule mandates equal access to health programs and that individuals be
treated “consistent with their gender identity,”[119] and prohibits denying or
limiting coverage, or imposing additional cost sharing or other limitations or
restrictions, “for any health services that are ordinarily or exclusively available to
individuals of one sex, or a transgender individual based on the fact that an
individual’s sex assigned at birth, gender identity, or gender otherwise recorded is
different from the one to which such health services are ordinarily or exclusively
available.”[120]
Although the final rule does not specifically include sexual orientation in the
definition of sex, the OCR concluded that “Section 1557’s prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of sex includes, at a minimum, sex discrimination
related to an individual’s sexual orientation where the evidence establishes that the
discrimination is based on gender stereotypes.”[121] OCR further noted that it
“has decided not to resolve in this rule whether discrimination on the basis of an
individual’s sexual orientation status alone is a form of sex discrimination under
Section 1557” and that it “will enforce Section 1557 in light of those developments
[in case law] and will consider issuing further guidance on this subject as
appropriate.”[122]
In Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, several states and religiously affiliated
health care organizations sued HHS claiming that the final rule violates, inter alia,
the Administrative Procedures Act by expanding the definition of “sex” to include
“gender identity.”[123] On December 31, 2016, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Texas issued a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting
HHS from enforcing Section 1557’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis
of gender identity.[124]
G.

LGBT Protections Under Illinois Law

The Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”) protects public employees from
employment discrimination on the basis of “sexual orientation,” which “means
actual or perceived heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, or gender-related
identity, whether or not traditionally associated with the person’s designated sex
at birth.”[125] Although the IHRA does not provide for punitive damages, it does
provide for “make whole” relief, including actual damages, interest, back pay, front
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pay, and emotional distress.[126] The IHRA established two administrative
agencies: the Illinois Department of Human Rights (“Department”) and the Illinois
Human Rights Commission (“Commission”). The Department is responsible for
issuing, receiving, investigating, conciliating, and dismissing charges of
discrimination and filing complaints of discrimination.[127] The Commission is
responsible for hearing and deciding complaints, issuing decisions, and approving
settlements proposed by the Department.[128]
In Sommerville v. Hobby Lobby Stores, the Commission recently affirmed a
decision of one of its Administrative Law Judges finding that an employer
discriminated against a transgender employee.[129] On February 28, 2013,
Meggan Sommerville filed two charges of discrimination against Hobby Lobby
Stores, alleging discrimination in employment and public accommodation on the
basis of sexual orientation discrimination related to her gender identity. Hobby
Lobby’s restrooms are designated by gender and are used by both employees and
the public. Hobby Lobby hired Sommerville in 1998 and, in 2007, Sommerville
began a transition from male to female that included medical treatment, having
her name legally changed, and obtaining a driver’s license identifying her has
female and a social security card with her female name. In 2010, Sommerville
informed the store manager that she intended to use the women’s restroom.
Hobby Lobby refused to let her use the women’s restroom and disciplined her for
doing so, unless she received anatomical surgery. Although Hobby Lobby built a
“unisex” restroom for her to use, Sommerville used the women’s restroom at a
nearby business.[130]
On May 15, 2015, a Commission Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued a
recommended liability determination and found that Hobby Lobby violated the
IHRA because its decision forbidding Sommerville access to and use of its women’s
restroom was motivated by her gender-related identity. The ALJ held that the
IHRA does not make any anatomical surgery a prerequisite to obtain genderrelated identity protection.[131] The ALJ further found that “a co-worker’s
discomfort cannot justify discriminatory terms and conditions of employment”
and that the “prejudices of co-workers are part of what the Act was meant to
prevent.”[132] Finally, the ALJ found that Hobby Lobby’s “segregation of
[Sommerville] to a ‘unisex’ restroom is an adverse act and subjects her to different
terms and conditions than similarly situated non-transgender employees.”[133]
On February 2, 2016, the ALJ issued a recommended order and decision on
damages ordering:
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Hobby Lobby to cease and desist from gender identity discrimination and allow
Sommerville access to its women’s restroom.



All Hobby Lobby’s managers in Illinois to attend sensitivity training on gender
identity discrimination.



Any of Hobby Lobby’s public contracts to be terminated and Hobby Lobby to be
barred from participating in any public contract for three years.



Hobby Lobby to pay Sommerville $298 in costs and out of pocket expenses,
$220,000 for emotional distress, and $97,000 in attorney’s fees.[134]

On November 2, 2016,[135] the Commission adopted the ALJ’s recommended
determination with respect to liability. As to damages, the Commission declined
to adopt the ALJ’s recommendation that Hobby Lobby’s managers attend
statewide sensitivity training and that Hobby Lobby be barred from participating
in public contracts for three years.[136] The Commission remanded the emotional
distress damages awarded to the ALJ for further articulation of the evidentiary
basis for the amount.[137] The Commission adopted all remaining aspects of the
ALJ’s decision and has yet to issue a formal decision.[138]
H.

LGBT Protections Under Other State Statutes And Executive Orders

Thirty-one other states and the District of Columbia offer various protections for
LGBT public employees by way of state statutes and executive orders. Legislation
protects public employees on the basis of both sexual orientation and gender
identity in the following states and the District of Columbia: California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and Washington.[139] New Hampshire and
Wisconsin have state statutes that protect public employees from employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, but not gender identity.[140]
Executive orders protect state employees against discrimination on the basis of
both sexual orientation and gender identity in the following states: Indiana,
Kentucky, Michigan, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.[141] Executive orders
protect state employees against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,
but not gender identity, in the following states: Alaska, Arizona, Missouri, and
Ohio.[142] State employees covered by these executive orders should beware that
some orders are mere statements of policy and may not provide for any claims to
be filed or relief to be obtained.
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Three states – Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee – have laws that actively
prevent the passage or enforcement of nondiscrimination laws on the basis of
sexual orientation or gender identity.[143]
III. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: A RIPE OPPORTUNITY TO EFFECT
CHANGE
Collective bargaining presents an opportunity to effect positive change where
federal, state, and local governments have been unable to do so, as the parties can
bargain for LGBT non-discrimination protections for public employees. Nondiscrimination clauses are likely mandatory subjects of bargaining under the
National Labor Relations Act.[144] Non-discrimination provisions protect
employees from discriminatory employer adverse actions that affect their terms
and conditions of employment, and from unions that discriminate in representing
employees. Bargained-for non-discrimination provisions also lay the groundwork
for employers and unions to push back against state and local laws that would
discriminate against employees because such discrimination would violate the
collective bargaining agreement.
The following is sample LGBT-inclusive non-discrimination language:
There shall be no discrimination against any employee with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions privileges of or opportunities for employment because of race, color,
religion, sex, (including pregnancy), gender, gender identity, gender expression, veteran
status, medical condition (including genetic characteristics), sexual orientation, age,
national origin, disability as defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act, linguistic
characteristics (such as accent or limited English proficiency, where not substantially jobrelated), marital status or any other basis prohibited by law.[145]

Although not a public employment relationship, professional and NCAA sports
provide an example as to how collective bargaining can effect positive change for
the LGBT community. The Major League Baseball[146], National Football
League[147], National Basketball Association[148], Major League Soccer[149],
and National Hockey League[150] collective bargaining agreements all prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, although none of these collective
bargaining agreements prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity or
gender expression. In 2016, the NBA relocated the 2017 All-Star Game from
Charlotte as a result of North Carolina House Bill 2, which was signed into law on
March 23, 2016, and mandated that multiple occupancy restrooms and changing
facilities be used only by individuals based on their biological sex[151], stating that
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the All-Star Game “is intended to be a global celebration of basketball, our league,
and the values for which we stand, and … we do not believe we can successfully
host our All-Star festivities in Charlotte in the climate created by HB2.”[152]
While it is unsettled whether National Collegiate Athletic Association players who
receive grant-in-aid scholarships are statutory employees under the National
Labor Relations Act,[153] the NCAA has taken steps outside of the collective
bargaining process to effect positive change for the LGBT community. In April
2016, the NCAA Board of Directors approved an anti-discrimination process for
bidding on all NCAA events, from the Final Four to educational conferences,
stating that it “considers the promotion of inclusiveness in … sexual orientation
and gender identity as a vital element to protecting the well-being of studentathletes, promoting diversity in hiring practices and creating a culture of
fairness.”[154] On September 12, 2016, the NCAA announced that it was relocating
all seven previously awarded championship events from North Carolina during the
2016-2017 academic year “because of the cumulative actions taken by the state
concerning civil rights protections.”[155] On March 20, 2017, in response to the
pressure from the NBA and the NCAA, North Carolina repealed House Bill 2 and
the mandate that multiple occupancy restrooms and changing facilities be used
only by individuals based on their biological sex; however, North Carolina still
prohibits local governments and the University of North Carolina, from regulating
access to multiple occupancy restrooms or changing facilities until December 1,
2020.[156]
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite alarming rates of discrimination, unemployment, and poverty, no federal
laws explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender
identity. While various courts and the EEOC have interpreted Title VII’s
prohibition on sex discrimination to cover LGBT discrimination, many of those
decisions do not cover such discrimination per se, but rather, cover it only to the
extent discrimination against LGBT employees can be made to fit the framework
of gender stereotype discrimination. In some circumstances, such as when
transgender employees experience discrimination because they do not conform
with stereotypes associated with their gender assigned at birth, the gender
stereotype framework may clearly apply. In other cases, the gender stereotype
paradigm cannot be made to fit discrimination against LGBT employees, leaving
them without a remedy. Until this gap is filled by either the U.S. Supreme Court
or legislative amendment such as the Equality Act, protections will not be complete
under federal law for LGBT employees. While public employees can look to a
patchwork of other federal laws and state laws and executive orders for protection,
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those protections are often insufficient and incomplete. Collective bargaining
presents an opportunity for labor unions and public employers to fill these gaps
and bargain for protections for LGBT employees that do not exist under federal
and state law.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By the Student Editors
Recent Development is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations
Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the
public employee collective bargaining statutes and the equal employment
opportunity laws.
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Protected Activity

In Moraine Valley Community College v. IELRB, 2017 IL App (1st) 152845-U, the
First District Appellate Court affirmed the IELRB’s finding that Morraine Valley
Community College violated sections 14(a)(3) and 14(a)(1) of the IELRA by
terminating Robin Meade, the local union president after she wrote a letter stating
that the College was not innovative toward adjunct faculty and that adjunct faculty
did not receive adequate wages, health benefits, and work schedules.
The College was a member of the League for Innovation in Community College, a
consortium promoting excellence and innovation in community colleges. When
the college replaced its president, it had to reapply for membership in the league.
Meade was employed by the college as an adjunct faculty member since 2003. On
August 20, 2013, Meade sent a letter to the league, stating that adjunct faculty did
not receive adequate wages, health benefits, and work schedules. As a result of this
letter, the college terminated Meade on the ground that her letter “went far beyond
responsible advocacy” and “was a personal attempt to falsely discrediut” the
college and “undermine its relationship with the [l]eague.” Consequently, the
Union filed an unfair practice charge. The IELRB decided that the college violated
sections 14(a)(3) and 14(a)(1) and the college appealed.
Section 14(a)(1) prohibits educational employers from taking adverse action
against an employee as a result of protected concerted activity; section 14(a)(3)
prohibits discrimination based on union activity. To establish a prima facie case
of a section 14(a)(3) violation, the Union must prove that: 1) the employee was
engaged in activity protected by section 14(a)(3); 2) the employer was aware of that
activity; and 3) the employer took adverse action against the employee for engaging
in that activity.
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In addition, attempts by employees and labor organizations to enlist the aid of
third parties or the public fall under the protection of the IELRA, as long as: 1) the
communications clearly indicate the existence of a labor dispute with the
employer; and 2) the critical statements are not maliciously untrue. Additionally,
the communication must constitute a concerted activity, which must be for the
purpose of inducing or preparing for action on behalf of the group to correct a
grievance or complaint.
The dispute in this case only concerned whether Meade engaged in protected
activity. The court held that Meade’s communication qualified as a concerted
activity, which was protected by the Act. First, her letter discussed the issues
experienced by the adjunct faculty as a group. Second, the matters raised in the
letter concerned the adjunct faculty’s wages, benefits and hours, as well as the
claim that the college reduced adjunct faculty hours to avoid providing health care
benefits under the Affordable Care Act. These facts demonstrated the college and
the union were engaged in labor dispute at the time of the letter.
The court found that the critical statements included in the letter were not so
maliciously untrue as to lose the protection under the IELRA. In the current case,
there was nothing in the record to demonstrate that Meade’s letter was maliciously
untrue or made with the knowledge that its contents were false or with reckless
disregard for their truth of falsity. Therefore, the court held the IELRB’s decision
was not clearly erroneous and affirmed.
In AFSCME Council 31 and Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois,
Respondent, 33 PERI ¶ 93 (IELRB 2017), the IELRB reversed a recommended
decision of its ALJ which had found that the university had violated sections
14(a)(5) and 14(a)(1) of the IELRA by unilaterally replacing bargaining unit
account technicians (ATs) with non-bargaining unit business administrative
associates (BAAs). The IELRB held that the unfair labor practice charge was
untimely.
April Moore negotiated and signed the 2011-2014 collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) between the union and the university as a union bargaining team member.
She was also a union steward from 2011 or 2012 to February or March 2014, and a
member of the union’s executive board until January 2014. Moore knew that BAAs
performed the same work as ATs since December 2012 because some BAAs talked
about their work with her at that time.
On December 18, 2012, the Union signed the CBA, which contains the following
language: “During the course of negotiations, the Union expressed concern that
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the University is seeking to erode the bargaining unit by purportedly assigning
bargaining unit work to non-bargaining unit personnel. . . . “
On February 25, 2015, the union filed the unfair labor practice charge in this case.
The IELRB observed that under section 15 of the IELRA, it does not have
jurisdiction over unfair labor practice charges filed more than six months after the
charging party knew or should have known of the actions which allegedly
constitute the unfair labor practice. In this case, at least as early as December 10,
2012, Moore knew that BAA was working in the same work area as the AT at the
university.
The IELRB held that Moore acted as the union’s agent since 2011. An individual is
an agent of a party when he or she has actual or apparent authority to act on that
party’s behalf; and apparent authority exists when a party has created a reasonable
impression that an individual is acting as its agent. In addition, the union stewards
have consistently been regarded as agents of the union that they represent. In this
case, Moore served as a steward from approximately 2011 or 2012 until February
or March 2014. Moreover, she also negotiated and signed the CBA as a union
bargaining team member. Therefore, the IELRB regarded Moore as the union’s
agent.
Moore’s knowledge that BAAs did the same work as ATs since at least as early as
December 10, 2012 could be imputed to the union because the law of agency in
Illinois holds that the knowledge of an agent, acting within the scope and extent of
his or her authority, is attributable to his or her principal. Therefore, the union
knew or should have known the alleged violation since at least as early as
December 10, 2012. However, the union filed the unfair labor practice charge on
February 25, 2015; therefore, the charge was untimely regarding the University’s
actions of which the Union knew or should have known before August 25, 2014.
IELRB Member Sered dissented. She maintained that although Moore had
observed BAAs performing TA work, there was no evidence that she knew the
university intended to have the work performed exclusively by BAAs until the
summer of 2014 and by that time she had ceased to be an agent of the union.
Member Sered observed that the language in the CBA merely stated the union’s
suspicions that the university was eroding the bargaining unit and such suspicions
did not constitute unequivocal notice of the alleged unfair labor practice. Member
Sered would have upheld the ALJ’s finding that the charge was timely.
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II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Duty to Bargain

In International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 700 v. ILRB, 2017 Ill App (1st)
152993, the First District Appellate Court reversed the ILRB Local Panel’s
dismissal of an unfair labor practice charge over the employer’s enactment on one
new work rule but affirmed the Panel’s dismissal of the charge regarding a second
new work rule.
The union filed unfair labor practice charges over the announcement of two new
employment rules: the “Gang Order” and the “Rules of Conduct Order.” The ALJ
held that the employer, Cook County Department of Corrections (“CDOC”), had
committed an unfair labor practice by unilaterally implementing the new rules.
The Local Panel reversed, and the union appealed. The Gang Order imposed a
new requirement on the CDOC employees: filling out a disclosure form regarding
the known or suspected gang affiliations of family members, friends, and several
other classes of acquaintances. The employer claimed that, because of the grave
danger gang activity poses to the public in the Chicago area these days, this rule
was necessary for the safety of the corrections officers, the inmates, and the general
public. However, the union urged that the requirements were overly burdensome,
requiring employees in some cases to investigate their own family members. The
Rules of Conduct Order included a provision expanding the reach of discipline for
on and off duty conduct to “any internet activity” including “electronic social media
and networking sites.” The union argued that this language was overly broad and
chilled employees’ rights under the IPLRA to engage in concerted activity. The
employer asserted that this did not change the nature of the activities the
employees were allowed to engage in, but only clarified where they could or could
not engage in those activities. Given that the parties were involved in negotiations
at the time the orders were announced, an opportunity for meaningful bargaining
over both orders was certainly available.
Applying the balancing test established in Central City Education Ass’n v.
IELRB, 149 Ill. 2d 496, 599 N.E>2d 892 (1992), the court held that because the
Gang Order could result in discipline against the employees, the benefits of
bargaining outweighed the burden on the department’s inherent managerial
authority to create safety rules. Illinois precedent had not yet considered the
lawfulness of simply creating a rule, as opposed to enforcing that rule, without
bargaining. Looking at precedent under the National Labor Relations Act and
other jurisdictions with similar labor laws, the court held that creating this rule
was enough to be an unfair labor practice. However, the court upheld the Local
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Panel’s finding as to the Rules of Conduct order, looking at NLRA precedent to
hold that, without a challenge to the chilling effect of the rules of conduct in
general, the social media/internet policy by itself could not be reasonably
construed to interfere with employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted
activity.
In State of Illinois v. AFSCME Council 31, 2017 IL App (4th) 160827, the Fourth
District Appellate Court stayed the decision of the ILRB State Panel which had
found that the State of Illinois and AFSCME Council 31 had reached impasse over
a single critical issue in their negotiations for a successor to the collective
bargaining agreement that expired on June 30, 2015. An ALJ had found that the
State had violated section 10(a)(4) when it failed to provide AFSCME information
relevant to such issues as wages and health insurance. But the ALJ also found that
the parties had bargained to impasse on subcontracting and other issues. The ALJ
ordered the parties to resume bargaining on those issues on which she found that
they were not at impasse and on wages and health insurance because any impasse
was not legitimate due to the State’s failure to provide requested information.
However, she allowed the State to unilaterally implement its final offer with
respect to those issues on which she found the parties to be at impasse.
The State Panel affirmed the ALF’s findings with respect to the State’s failure to
provide information but held that the State had not breached its duty to bargain
when it broke off negotiations and declared impasse in January 2016 because they
parties had reached impasse over subcontracting which was a single critical issue
in their negotiations. AFSCME appealed to the First District Appellate Court which
granted AFSCME’s motion to stay the ILRB’s decision. The State appealed to the
Fourth District Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court consolidated that
cases in the Fourth District.
The Fourth District granted AFSCME’s renewed request for a stay. The court cited
section 3-111(a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(1), which
provides that a stay of the ILRB’s decision should be granted only if the union
shows, among other things, “a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.” See
Ill. S. Ct. R. 335(i)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). The court stated that the question of
whether the parties had arrived at an impasse was a question of fact. Thus, the
court held that the ILRB’s finding of an impasse would be upheld unless it was
“clearly evident” from the record that the parties were not at an impasse.
Ultimately, the Fourth District determined that the union raised a “fair question”
as to whether the ILRB properly invoked the private sector’s single critical issue
exception to the requirement that any impasse occur with respect to all issues in
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dispute. The court looked to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Duffy Tool &
Stamping, L.L.C. v. NLRB, 223 F.3d 995, 999 (7th Cir. 2000), where the court held
that “piecemeal impasse” should not give the employer a right to unilaterally
implement changes in the terms and conditions of employment. A ruling otherwise
would undercut the employer’s duty to bargain in good faith with the union. Thus,
Duffy meant that impasse is required on all issues, as a whole, before there can be
unilateral implementation.
The Fourth District held that the union showed “good cause” under section 3111(a)(1); and therefore, granted the union’s motion to stay the ILRB’s decision.
In IAFF Local 413 and City of Rockford, Case No. S-CA-15-030 (ILRB State Panel
Apr. 11, 2017), the State Panel reversed a recommended decision of its ALJ which
had found that the city violated sections 10(a)(4) and 10(a)(1) of the IPLRA by
refusing to include agreed to language in the collective bargaining agreement. The
State Panel held that although the parties had agreed to the language itself, they
had not agreed on whether the language would be included in the CBA or would be
included in the employer’s rules and regulations.
The city had unilaterally changed its sick leave policy to require that whenever an
employee who had taken two sick leaves in the calendar year provide medical
certification upon returning from sick leave. The union had grieved the change
and the parties agreed to discuss the change curing their negotiations for a
successor CBA. During those negotiations the parties agreed on language
governing the medical certification requirement but the city refused to incorporate
that language into the successor CBA. The Coty believed that the agreed-to
language should go in the city’s rules and regulations. The State Panel held that
because the parties failed to reach a meeting of the minds as to where the agreedto language should appear, the city did not breached its duty to bargain by refusing
to incorporate the language in the successor contract.
B.

ULP Procedures

In Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241 v. ILRB, 2017 Ill App (1st) 160999, the
First District Appellate Court held that issuing a Request For Proposals (“RFP”)
does not constitute a sufficient “unambiguous announcement” of an employer’s
intent to subcontract so as to trigger the statute of limitations for an unfair labor
practice charge for failure to bargain.
The Union filed unfair labor practice charges when the Chicago Transit Authority
(“CTA”), in the fall of 2013, subcontracted and replaced twenty-four bargaining
unit positions in eight job classifications without bargaining. The replacements
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occurred in conjunction with the implementation of the new Ventra card system
across the CTA. Three years earlier, in 2010, the CTA had published an RFP, which
it made available to the union, outlining its plan and calling for proposals to
implement an “open fare” system. The RFP was over 100 pages long, and included
many details of the new system, including a reduction in labor costs. The CTA
argued that providing the RFP to the union in 2010 was sufficient notice of the
intent to subcontract bargaining unit work, making the union’s 2013 unfair labor
practice charge untimely. The ALJ agreed, the ILRB Local Panel adopted the ALJ’s
recommended decision and order in March of 2016, and the union appealed.
Illinois law requires that the statute of limitations for filing an unfair labor practice
begins to run when a change in policy is “unambiguously announced.” The court
considered, for the first time in Illinois, whether an RFP over 100 pages long can
constitute an “unambiguous” announcement of the intention to subcontract. The
ILRB had reasoned that informing the union of a request for subcontracting
proposals was sufficient notice unless the employer expressly stated it was not. The
court disagreed. Analyzing precedent from out of state, the court reasoned that the
CTA had plenty of opportunities to make its intentions clear but failed to do so.
Rather than adopting the Local Panel’s interpretation, the court asserted the rule
that the statute of limitations for filing an unfair labor practice charge over an
employer’s failure to bargain over subcontracting bargaining unit work begins to
run when the employer makes an “explicit announcement” of its intention to
subcontract. The case was remanded to the ILR for hearing on the merits of the
charge.
III. EEO DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Sexual Orientation Discrimination

In Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir.
2017), The Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals issued a landmark decision
holding that employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation falls
within sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate on
the basis of a person’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin….” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a).
Kimberly Hively was a part-time, adjunct professor at Ivy Tech Community
College’s (“Ivy Tech”) South Bend, Indiana campus since 2000. Hively was openly
lesbian. Between 2009 and 2014, Hively unsuccessfully applied for at least six fulltime positions with the school. Hively believed she was discriminated against
based on her sexual orientation. Hively filed a pro se charge with the Equal
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Employment Opportunity Commission and received a right-to-sue letter. She sued
in U.S. District Court in the Northern District of Illinois. The district court
dismissed the suit with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Title VII for sex
discrimination. Hively appealed the dismissal to Seventh Circuit. The Seventh
Circuit analyzed, de novo, what it means to discriminate on the basis of sex and
whether actions taken on the basis of sexual orientation are a subcategory of
actions taken on the basis of sex.
In her majority opinion, Chief Judge Wood stated the interpretation of this
issue is guided by the Supreme Court’s approach in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998) when addressing whether Title VII covers
same-sex sexual harassment inflicted by a man on another man. In Oncale, the
Court held that male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was “assuredly
not the principal evil” Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII, Title VII
extends to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.
Hively argued that discrimination based on sexual orientation is sex
discrimination under both a comparative and associational theory. Under the
comparative theory, Hively argued that if she had been a man and was sexually
attracted to women, Ivy Tech would have neither refused to promote, nor
terminate her. Judge Wood stated that the discriminatory behavior cannot not
exist without accounting for Hively’s biological sex and her lack of conformity to
those gender stereotypes. Judge Wood determined then that one cannot
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation without doing so on the basis of sex.
Under the associational theory, Hively argued that she was discriminated
against because of whom she associates with. This theory comes from Loving v.
Virgina, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), where the Supreme Court held that discriminating
against an individual for associating with a different race has discriminated against
that individual on the basis of race. Judge Wood applied the same logic to this case
and concluded that Ivy Tech discriminated against Hively for intimately
associating with other women. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit reversed and
remanded the district court’s judgment for further proceedings.
Judge Posner, in a concurring opinion, agreed with the majority to reverse
the district court’s judgment, but analyzed an alternate approach. Judge Posner
insisted that statutory interpretation of Title VII should be “infused” with how the
law is significant today rather than an “originalism” approach of interpretation.
He concluded that discrimination based on sexual orientation is essentially a
discriminating against an individual for failure to fulfill stereotypical gender roles.
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In a dissenting opinion, Judge Sykes, joined by Judges Bauer and Kanne,
stated that sexual-orientation discrimination is an independent category of
discrimination and does not fall under sex discrimination. Judge Sykes claimed
that the court was impatient to protect homosexuals from workplace
discrimination, and that the majority was not authorized to amend Title VII by
statutory interpretation. Judge Sykes concluded that Title VII’s language does not
prohibit sexual orientation-discrimination and that Hively’s case was properly
dismissed in district court.

